Europe is ReArming: Here’s what could go wrong

Imagine this: you've spent over a decade advising on defense and security in Washington, through multiple administrations and two drawn-out wars. Now, you're reading the latest news out of Brussels and Berlin: Europe is ramping up defense spending. You want to cheer them on, but you can't shake the memory of how seemingly unrestrained military spending in your own country came at the expense of other priorities - education, infrastructure, social support, jobs. You hope European leaders can learn from America's missteps; working out how to counter threats without sacrificing the social fabric that holds democracies together. But as the headlines grow more urgent, you have to ask: are they heading down the same path?

Dr. Kris Inman is a former senior U.S. government official and subject-matter expert in democracy, counterterrorism, and violent extremism prevention. She has worked in the Middle East, Africa and Europe. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Davis, and has held faculty appointments at Georgetown University, Johns Hopkins SAIS, and the University of Southern California.

Europe’s Need for Defense

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has driven decisions to shift public spending towards defense across the European continent. These spending decisions are documented in agreements like the March, 2022 Versailles Declaration, in which leaders promised to invest more and better to shore up Europe’s defenses. 

Of course, this follows Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine’s Crimea and Donbas regions in 2014, which did not result in similar calls for immediate hardening of defenses. That inaction a decade ago meant that EU Member States had to respond faster and in a more reactive manner than, perhaps, would have otherwise been necessary if the alarm bells were sufficiently addressed back then. 

Today, European countries are increasingly wary of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and recent drone activity into neighboring countries (e.g., Poland and Denmark). The Versailles Declaration has been reaffirmed every year since its origination. In 2025, European leaders presented the ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan, which aims to boost Europe’s self-reliance in defense, enable more support for Ukraine, and sets the stage for up to €800B of additional defense spending. These decisions are made all the more important in light of the Trump Administration’s on-again/off-again support for Ukraine, and European security in general. 

As Europe embarks on a surge in defense spending, the central question is not whether to rearm, but how to do so strategically. Of utmost importance will be balancing immediate security needs with long-term economic sustainability, democratic values, and a coherent political endgame that avoids the pitfalls that have plagued military build-ups throughout history.

What can go right?

Bolstering hard defenses in Europe holds at least three benefits for the region: enhancing regional defense, pooled resources, and potential positive economic impact.

Regional defense 

Since Russia poses a threat to Europe as a region, the best response is likely a coordinated, regional one. As such, the European Commission has newly proposed the EU “Drone Wall”, set to be fully operational in 2027. This network of radars, jammers, and acoustic sensors would, if realized, enable a regionally coordinated defensive posture. And, it would be more cost effective than relying on million-euro missiles to shoot down a few-thousand euro drones. However, to be fully realized it must overcome political and technical obstacles.

This kind of coordination around defense innovations and responses has, to date, been missing from Europe. Last year, Mario Draghi’s report highlighted that collectively, Europe is the second largest military spender, but the defense industry is “too fragmented, hindering its ability to produce at scale, and it suffers from a lack of standardisation and interoperability of equipment, weakening Europe’s ability to act as a cohesive power.” Addressing this deficit by shoring up Europe’s collective defense is a benefit. 

Pooled resources

Europe has tremendous collective spending power, but only when it pools its resources effectively. What does this mean for military spending that has increased across Europe, with economic estimates suggesting this will be sustained by more public borrowing?  

In the face of such fiscal realities, pooling resources across EU and NATO countries could enable investments to create new technologies and services to bolster the EU and UK's defense capabilities, which will be necessary to realize the ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan. 

Programs such as Security Action For Europe, or SAFE, enable the EU to borrow €150B against the security of the EU budget for priority defense investments. This approach enables many EU governments to borrow more cheaply as part of the Commission than they could alone. 

In an increasingly interconnected world, pooling resources effectively and efficiently is surely a boon for Europe. 

Economic upside

Warfare has driven significant technological advancements. Investments in research and development into new technologies, like anti-drone defenses which have not kept pace with innovations in drone technology, could promise an economic boon for Europe over the next decade. 

Of course, this presumes a balance is struck between strategic spending and investment in defense technologies versus reactive spending that becomes wasteful and neglecting domestic affairs. 

What can go wrong?

At the same time that Europe takes reasonable steps to harden its defenses, there are pitfalls that leaders will want to avoid lest they become fools that rush in. These include creating a military-industrial complex that takes on a life of its own, neglecting domestic services that would erode legitimacy and potentially cause political instability, and failing to plan for an endgame.  

European Military-Industrial Complex

The American Military-Industrial Complex was born in the aftermath of two World Wars, a War in Korea, and a Cold War with the Soviet Union. In his farewell address, President Dwight Eisenhower described how the US got there. Reflecting back on his speech, one sees parallels with the decisions before European leaders today: “We can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions.” 

Eisenhower also warned:

“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”

As Europe plans and begins to execute ReArm Europe, leaders and citizens should put in place guardrails and accountability mechanisms to protect against the “acquisition of unwarranted influence,” especially given the billions of euros promised to be pumped into this industry. 

Among the most obvious topics to address here are disincentivizing war in perpetuity and arms races among nations (especially Russia) and industry itself. 

Neglecting the public and public services

We all know the constant refrain from our elected leaders - ‘tough decisions have to be made’ because public spending entails priorities and trade-offs. Right now, the priority is hardening defenses to protect against Russian aggression, which many see as an existential threat to Europe. Where does this leave public spending on other priorities, like healthcare, jobs, and education? 

Every country will have to weigh the trade-offs necessary to sufficiently bolster defenses with the social and political realities they have at home. Already, there is a decline in public sentiment toward increased spending. The geographic breakdown of this sentiment shows that, understandably, Eastern countries are more concerned than other parts of the continent. The September 2025 Polling Europe data showed that in Italy, 48% of respondents support increased defense budgets, while 68% in Spain do. In Poland, 86% of respondents strongly favor greater defense spending.

Public approval for increased public spending is necessary to maintain stability in planning and executing ReArm Europe and other strategies. Elected leaders will need to monitor this sentiment, especially as defense spending potentially cuts into other services, and engage with constituents to stay the course. 

This will be more challenging for countries further away from the active conflict zone, like Ireland and Italy. Citizens in these countries have a different risk calculus than those closer to the frontlines like the Balkan states. Those governments will need to make the case to their citizens that supporting the region ensures everyone’s safety, not just those countries that border Russia. 

Failure to make the public case could backfire. We need look no further than America’s turn to populism and the “American First” agenda following two decades of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, which saw massive investment in defense while other parts of America (jobs, education, some would say democratic institutions themselves) were hollowed out.  

No exit strategy

Currently, there does not appear to be an exit or de-escalation strategy. Repeated lessons learned from US engagement in the last few decades of war point to a central, crucial issue: no exit strategy. For those of us working in Washington, when we follow the news coming out of Europe, it feels like deja vu. What is the plan for drawing down and reallocating budgets toward social services and prevention work once the threat passes?

One way European leaders can address this is to be very clear about what success is, and subsequently ensure that defense spending is aligned to the success strategy. Once success is achieved, there must be a plan for what’s next - the so-called “day after” plan. 

Conclusion

Referring to businesses navigating the Age of Polycrisis, Karthik Ramanna (professor of business and public policy at the University of Oxford) said: "If you don't play the short game, you're not around to play the long game, but if you only play the short game, you'll find yourself outcompeted by your peers in the long term."

This applies to what Europe is navigating now: If the EU doesn't act decisively to shore its defenses in the short term, it may not survive to have a long term. But if it focuses solely on immediate defense needs, it risks losing the economic, moral, and social foundations that ensure longevity and strength over time.

Europe must maintain its democratic institutions, rule of law, and respect for human rights and civil liberties. These foundational values must not be eroded in the name of "national” or “regional security." The strength of European democracies lies not only in military capability but in preserving the very principles that distinguish them from authoritarian aggressors like Russia. This becomes part of the "long game" strategy - ensuring that in defending Europe physically, we don't undermine the democratic foundations that make Europe worth defending.

If your organisation needs tailored insights or strategic support pertaining to security and defence policy, then get in touch with us at Plato Group.

This thought leadership paper is published in collaboration between Dr. Kris Inman and Plato Group Ltd. The usual disclaimer applies.

Dr. Kris Inman

Dr. Inman has held leadership roles at the US Institute of Peace and USAID-funded initiatives, where she designed and managed large-scale research, policy, and violence prevention programs in Africa, the Middle East, and beyond. A recognized thought leader, she has briefed policymakers at the US Congress, State Department, Department of Defense, and the Defeat ISIS Coalition. She oversaw evaluation of the world’s largest democracy program in Ukraine, as well as USAID’s terrorism risk and resilience assessment in West Africa. She is based in Washington but advises clients globally.

Plato Group Ltd.

Plato Group is a network of global economists, policy experts, academics, bankers and geopolitical advisers. They have held senior positions in governments and central banks all over the world, as well as at the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the OSCE and leading global educational institutions. They are seasoned practitioners with direct experience in advanced and emerging markets. Plato Group blends international and local expertise, providing comprehensive insights tailored to a client’s specific needs.